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1 Introduction
Collective incentives to restrict trade have long been acknowledged as a prevalent phenomenon in markets.
The inherent instability of cooperative agreements attempting to exploit such incentives has also been
extensively discussed in the literature. A common feature of the models that address these issues consists
in assuming that collusive practices arise only on one side of the market. For instance, particular emphasis
has been given to the formation of cartels by oligopolistic …rms that face price-taking consumers.1 More
recently, developments in auction theory have addressed the issue of collusion among numerous buyers
facing a single seller.2
When traders on both sides of a market behave strategically, both sides can in principle form cartels
with the purpose of enhancing their collective market power with respect to the opponent’s. Is it then
possible that cartels emerge and persist on the two sides of a market? Is it possible for collusion to be a
desirable phenomenon in this context?
These questions were raised long ago by Galbraith (1952), who claimed positive answers, in his theory
of countervailing power. Galbraith asserted that “in the competitive model, the power of the …rm as a
seller is checked or circumscribed by the competitor who o¤ers, or threatens to o¤er, a better bargain.
The role of the buyer on the other side of such market is essentially a passive one. However, (...) the active
restraint is provided not by the competitor but from the other side of the market by strong buyers”.3
Thus, the existence of market power on one side of the market would create an incentive for the other side
to organize another position of power neutralizing the former. Countervailing power was seen behind the
emergence of labor unions: “One …nds the strongest labor unions in the United States where markets are
served by strong corporations. And it is not an accident that the large automobile, steel, electrical, farm
machinery companies all bargain with powerful unions. It is the strength of the corporations in these
industries that made it necessary for workers to develop the protection of countervailing power”.4 The
retail market o¤ered another example of the operation of countervailing power. The great development
of department-store chains, food chains, mail order houses was interpreted as the countervailing response
of retailers, on consumers’ behalf, to sellers’ previously established positions of power.
Galbraith’s claims were not sustained with a rigorous model. And the empirical evidence is somewhat
controversial.5 Yet, the preceding descriptions are suggestive and, despite their formal shortcomings,
Galbraith’s arguments had great impact on the development of economic policies in the second half of
1See d’Aspremont et al. (1983) and Donsimoni, Economides and Polemarchakis (1986) for a characterization of stable
cartels in the context of oligopolistic markets.
2See McAfee and McMillan (1992).
3Galbraith (1952), p. 113.
4Galbraith (1952), p. 114-115.
5See Scherer and Ross (1990), ch. 14, and references therein.
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the 20th century. Fifty years later, very little research has formally addressed the problem,6 and it is
still unclear whether the theory of countervailing power can stand a game-theoretic scrutiny. The present
work aims at contributing to such analysis.
In this paper, we examine the problem of bilateral cartel formation in the context of decentralized
exchange economies à la Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), with a continuum of homogeneous buyers and
a continuum of homogeneous sellers. Buyers and sellers are randomly matched in pairs and bargain over
the price to exchange one unit of an indivisible good. In markets that remain stationary at all rounds of
trade (as in Rubinstein and Wolinsky [1985] where, at each round, new traders enter exactly in the same
measure as satis…ed traders exit), the advantage of the short side of the market is not su¢cient to create
collective incentives on either side to exclude some traders from the market.7 However, such incentives
do exists, and can be strong, in a market that does not remain stationary as it clears over several rounds
of trade. Consequently, our analysis is carried out within environments where the relative measure of
buyers to sellers changes across the di¤erent rounds of trade.
The market operates for …nitely many rounds, with no entry of new traders after the …rst round.8 At
each round, buyers and sellers search for a trading partner and, if they …nd a match, they bargain over
the price at which to transact. If they reach an agreement, they trade and exit the market, otherwise
they search again in the following round. Equilibrium prices at the di¤erent rounds of trade depend on
the relative measures of buyers and sellers that are active in the market at those rounds. Agents in the
short side of the market are able to apportion a bigger fraction of the surplus generated by trade.
Cartels are coalitions aiming to increase the collective bene…ts of their members, all of whom trade
in the same side of the market. Actual cartels have a major impact both on the search and on the
bargaining patterns of traders. Cartels may turn a market with decentralized trade into a market with
centralized trade, substantially altering the process of price formation. In our model, however, cartels are
endowed with much weaker prerogatives. We will assume that the only instrument that cartels have at
their disposal is the restriction in the market participation of their members. Thus, each cartel chooses
how many members, if any, to withdraw from the market and it redistributes its total payo¤ in order
to compensate inactive members for their abstention. Given the indivisibility of the good traded, this
is equivalent to cartels setting their own supply or demand. Even when cartels are active, prices are set
through bilateral bargaining à la Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985). These assumptions make our analysis
tractable and our results independent of ad hoc assumptions concerning the process of price formation.
Moreover, we suppose that only one cartel can form on each side of the market and that a cartel might
6Bloch and Ghosal (2000), discussed below, represents the notable exception.
7See Bloch and Ghosal (2000) for a proof of this claim.
8The preceding description is best interpreted as the stage game of a repeated game, in which buyers and sellers repeatedly
want to buy and sell, respectively, one unit of a good that perishes after two rounds of trade.
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not have control over the whole population on its side. Outsiders of the cartel always participate in the
market, whereby cartels actually determine the total quantities that will be supplied or demanded in
the market. Given the potential measures of buyers and sellers and the levels of cartel memberships, we
suppose that the two cartels play a non-cooperative game where the quantities supplied and demanded
are set simultaneously. Non-members generally bene…t from the formation of a cartel: they trade the
indivisible good at the same price as cartel members, but they do not have to compensate inactive cartel
members. This free-riding problem greatly limits the extent to which cartels can e¤ectively reduce trade
while expecting to maintain their memberships. Consequently, not all outcomes attained as equilibria of
the quantity-setting game are equally relevant. A natural criterion for selecting among the equilibria of the
quantity-setting game consists in requiring that they be supported by stable levels of cartel memberships.
Stable market outcomes are pro…les of cartel memberships and an associated equilibrium of the
quantity-setting game at which memberships are stable, in that cartel sizes do not trigger defections.
We prove that the set of stable market outcomes is non-empty, and we provide its full characterization.
Stable market outcomes can be of two di¤erent types.
The …rst type is such that at least one cartel actively restrains trade and such that the level of
participation in the market is balanced on both sides, regardless of the potential sizes of supply and
demand. Market outcomes might be ine¢cient when both cartels are active, because not all gains from
trade are apportioned. Thus, using Galbraith’s terminology, both sides exercise countervailing power.
But when only one cartel (the one that forms in the long side of the market) is active, only one side of
the market exercises countervailing power, restraining its participation up to the point at which supply
and demand coincide. Consequently, this kind of stable market outcomes results in an e¢cient allocation
and the e¤ect of countervailing power is limited to a redistribution of the total surplus.
The second type of stable market outcomes is such that only one cartel (more likely the one that
forms on the long side of the market) is active, which reduces its participation in the market so as to
slightly undercut the opponent’s. In this situation, only one side of the market exercises countervailing
power and the total surplus is redistributed in favor of this side. The market outcome is not e¢cient,
but the reduction in the quantity traded with respect to its potential total volume is not very big.
Our paper owes much to Bloch and Ghosal (2000) that precedes us in addressing the issue of cartel
formation in the context of an exchange economy with bilateral trade and bargaining. Bloch and Ghosal
(2000) considers the formation of cartels of buyers or sellers in markets with an equal and …nite number of
buyers and sellers. They show that cartels might be active on both sides of the market, but active cartels
never withdraw more than one trader. Although there are many apparent di¤erences between our work
and that of Bloch and Ghosal, our results are closely related and, we believe, complementary to theirs.
The peculiarity of our model can be ascribed to our assumption that cartels set continuous quantities.
The continuum assumption, although debatable from a descriptive point of view (since bilateral collusion
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seems more likely in markets with small numbers of traders on each side), is crucial to attain a tractable
analysis, and permits to analyze two-sided cartel activity in markets that are ex ante unbalanced, a case
that is not addressed by Bloch and Ghosal (2000).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model of decentralized trade is presented in
Section 2. In Section 3, the non-cooperative game played by the cartels is described, and the notions
of cartel stability are introduced. The equilibria of the quantity-setting game played by the cartels are
characterized in Section 4. Stable market outcomes are described in Section 5.
2 Decentralized trade
Consider a market with a continuum of identical sellers and a continuum of identical buyers. Each seller
owns one unit of a homogeneous indivisible good and his valuation of the good is normalized at zero.
Each buyer owns one unit of a perfectly divisible commodity and his valuation for the indivisible good is
normalized at one. All agents are perfectly patient.9
The market operates for two trading rounds t = 1; 2.10 It is assumed that a measure b of buyers and
a measure s of sellers enter the market in the …rst round, and that the market is potentially unbalanced.
No new agents enter after the …rst round. In each round, buyers and sellers are randomly matched in
pairs and each pair bargain over the surplus generated by the indivisible good.
The matching mechanism is characterized by non-negligible search frictions. At each round t; the
traders on the short side of the market do not …nd a trading partner with certainty, but only with
probability ° 2 (0; 1). The traders on the long side of the market are matched with an even smaller
probability µt = °
minfbt;stg
maxfbt;stg ; being bt and st the measures of active buyers and sellers at round t:
When a buyer and a seller get matched, they bargain a price to trade the indivisible object. At either
round of trade, the bargaining game consists in an ultimatum game. Namely, a fair lottery selects one of
the parties to propose a partition of the surplus; the other party responds by accepting the o¤er or by
rejecting it. Upon acceptance, the agents trade and leave the market. Upon rejection in the …rst period,
the match breaks and the agents return to the market, searching for other partners in the second round
of trade. A rejection in the second round implies that the game ends without trade for the given match.
The payo¤s for trading at price p 2 [0; 1] at either round are p to the seller and 1 ¡ p to the buyer. The
utility associated with no trade is zero.
At the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game, the proposer o¤ers the responder
a share equal to the latter’s expected value of returning to the pool of unmatched agents in the following
9Introducing pure time preferences that are common for all agents would not alter the qualitative features of the results.
10This assumption is made for tractability. The results can be generalized to the case in which the market operates for
more trading rounds:
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round, and the responder accepts. In other words, the responder is given his outside option at that period
and the proposer gets the residual surplus. Consequently, there exists a unique market equilibrium such
that, at each round, all pairs of traders immediately agree on the same price.11 Since the populations of
buyers and sellers typically change from one round to the next, the bargaining pairs face endogenous and
time-varying outside options.
Suppose that sellers are initially the sort side of the market, i.e. s · b: At period t; outside options
can be de…ned recursively as
xLB;t = = µt+1
¡ 1
2
¡
1 ¡ xSS;t+1
¢
+ 12x
L
B;t+1
¢
+ (1 ¡ µt+1) xLB;t+1
for buyers, and
xSS;t = °
¡ 1
2
¡
1 ¡ xLB;t+1
¢
+ 12x
S
S;t+1
¢
+ (1 ¡ °) xSS;t+1
for sellers, where the superscripts L and S stand for long and short side of the market, respectively.
Starting from the last period and substituting backwards, one can compute the agent’s present dis-
counted value of participating in a two-rounds market, which is
¼LB = xLB;0 =
(µ1(2¡° )+(2¡µ1)µ2)
4
(1)
for buyers, and
¼SS = xSS;0 =
°(4¡°¡µ2)
4
(2)
for sellers. Note that both ¼LB and ¼
S
S depend on the initial measures of buyers b and sellers s; through
the matching probabilities µ1 = ° sb and µ2 = °
(1¡°)s
b¡°s : Symmetric expected values can be computed if
b < s.
Thus, in general, the individual expected gains to a buyer, when the initial measure of buyers is b and
the initial measure of sellers is s, can be written as
¼B(b; s) =
8<: ¼SB(b; s) if b · s¼LB(b; s) if b ¸ s ;
where
¼SB(b; s) ´ ° (4¡° )(s¡°b)¡(1¡°)°b4(s¡° b) and ¼LB(b; s) ´ ° sb (3¡2°)(b¡°s)+(1¡° )b4(b¡°s) ;
and where ¼SB(b; s) = ¼LB(b; s) for b = s:
11The assumption that traders use a (random proposer) ultimatum game is made for expositional clarity. Other bargaining
games yield the same market equilibrium. See Ponsati (2002) for a proof that under in…nite horizon alternating o¤ers
barganing, ultimatum strategies can still prevail and yield a unique market equilibrium as well.
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As for the group expected gains of traders on one side of the market, there might exist collective
incentives to exclude some agents from trade. This occurs because buyers’ (sellers’) collective utility
generally increases when the measure of buyers (sellers) trading on the market is reduced, given the
measure of active sellers (buyers).
In a market where the initial measures of traders is (b; s); the group expected payo¤ to the buyers
that enter the market and face a measure s of sellers is simply ¼B(b; s)b: When the buyers are the long
side of the market, that is when b ¸ s; their joint utility is
¼LB (b; s)b = °s
(3¡2°)(b¡°s)+(1¡°)b
4(b¡°s) ;
whose derivative with respect to b takes value
@
@b ¼
L
B(b; s)b = ¡ (1¡°)°
2s2
4(b¡°s)2 < 0 :
It immediately follows that a decrease in the measure of active traders is always collectively bene…cial
for the long side of the market. Conversely, when b · s; the collective utility of the agents in the short
side of the market is
¼SB(b; s)b = b°
(4¡°)(s¡°b)¡(1¡°)° b
4(s¡°b) :
It is easy to check that ¼SB(b; s)b is a strictly concave function in all its domain and that it reaches a
maximum at
bb (s) ´ s(5¡2°)¡p(1¡°)(5¡2°)°(5¡2°) :
Note that the above maximum lies outside the relevant range when bb (s) ¸ s; that is when
° · 7¡
p
17
4 = 0:71922 ´ °: (3)
For further reference, we will say that search frictions are high when condition (3) is met, otherwise we
will say that the search frictions are low .
Therefore, collective incentives to restrict market participation are present, and they might exist even
for the short side of the market. It seems then natural to analyze whether coalitions that attempt to
restrict trade are sustainable or not, and what impact they have on market performance. We address
these issues in the following sections.
3 Cartel Games
We assume that one and only one cartel operates on each side of the market. The buyers’ cartel controls
¹Bb buyers, and ¹Ss sellers belong to the sellers’ cartel, where 0 < ¹B ; ¹S · 1. There are (1 ¡ ¹B) b free
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buyers and (1 ¡ ¹S ) s free sellers, who operate as independent traders and remain active in the market
as long as they have trade to carry out.
Cartels play a quantity-setting game where they simultaneously choose their participation level in the
market. Given the bilateral nature of trade and the indivisibility of the traded good, each cartel restricts
the quantity actually traded by withdrawing some measure of its members from the market. In particular,
the buyers’ cartel sets the measure of its active members, i.e. it sets its demand qB 2 [0; ¹Bb] ; and the
sellers’ cartel sets its supply qS 2 [0; ¹Ss] : Since free traders always participate in trade, the total market
demand is given by ¯ = qB + (1 ¡ ¹B) b and the total market supply is equal to ¾ = qS + (1 ¡ ¹S) s:
Therefore it is as if the buyers’ cartel sets market demand ¯ 2 [(1 ¡ ¹B) b; b] and the sellers’ cartel chooses
market supply ¾ 2 [(1 ¡ ¹S ) s; s]: The aggregate cartel payo¤s are then redistributed equally among cartel
members in order to compensate the inactive agents for their abstention.12
For each pro…le of cartel memberships ¹ = (¹B ; ¹S ), the payo¤s of the quantity-setting game G¹;
where both cartels act simultaneously, can be expressed as functions of market demand and supply as
B (¯; ¾) =
8<: (¯ ¡ (1 ¡ ¹B) b)¼SB(¯; ¾) if (1 ¡ ¹B) b · ¯ · ¾(¯ ¡ (1 ¡ ¹B) b)¼LB(¯; ¾) if ¾ · ¯ · b
and
S (¯; ¾) =
8<: (¾ ¡ (1 ¡ ¹S ) s) ¼SS (¯; ¾) if (1 ¡ ¹S) s · ¾ · ¯(¾ ¡ (1 ¡ ¹S ) s) ¼LS (¯; ¾) if ¯ · ¾ · s ;
respectively, for the buyers’ and the sellers’ cartels.
Let ¯ (¾) and ¾ (¯) denote the best responses of the buyers’ and sellers’ cartels, respectively, in the
game G¹ : If necessary, we will use the notation ¯¹B (¾) and ¾¹S (¯) to stress that, for a given quantity
traded by the opponent, the best response of the buyers’ (sellers’) cartel depends on the cartel’s own
size but not on the other cartel’s membership level. Similarly, the payo¤ functions will be denoted by
B¹B (¯; ¾) and S¹S (¯; ¾).
A market outcome is a pro…le (¹B ; ¹S; ¯ ; ¾) such that (¯; ¾) is a Nash equilibrium of G¹; that is,
¾ = ¾ (¯) and ¯ = ¯ (¾) for the given cartel sizes.
A market outcome is a reasonable prediction for the operation of the market only when cartels can
be expected to maintain their membership levels. Cartels might not preserve their sizes, either because
some of their members wish to defect and become free traders, or because some free traders wish to join
the cartel. In the present model, since cartels generate positive externalities that bene…t outsiders on
the same side of the market, the incentives of insiders to defect from the cartel may strongly undermine
the stability of a market outcome. Conversely, the incentives of outsiders to join the cartel will not
12It is assumed that each cartel can enforce the exclusion of traders, i.e. its members cannot sneak in the market when
they have been ordered to stay out and they cannot organize parallel trade of the excluded quantities.
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be a concern. With a continuum of non-atomic agents, the defection of a single agent has a negligible
impact on the market outcome, therefore the notion of stability must not rely directly on immunity from
unilateral deviations.
Our concept of cartel stability …rst postulates the absence of incentives to deviate by coalitions of
small but strictly positive measure. Given a market outcome (¹B ; ¹S ;¯ ; ¾); we will say that an "-coalition
(that is a measure " > 0 of agents) of buyers in the cartel bene…ts from defecting the cartel if and only if
¼B (¯¹B¡" (¾) ; ¾) >
¼B(¯;¾)(¯¡(1¡¹B)b)
¹Bb
:
Similarly, an "-coalition of buyers that are outsiders to the cartel bene…ts from joining the cartel if and
only if
¼B(¯¹B+"(¾);¾)(¯¹B+"(¾)¡(1¡¹B¡")b)
(¹B+²)b
> ¼B(¯; ¾) :
The conditions under which an "-coalition of sellers bene…ts from a deviation can be expressed analogously.
Observe that, in assessing whether an "-coalitional deviation is pro…table or not at the market outcome
(¹B ; ¹S ; ¯; ¾), the quantity supplied or demanded on the other side of the market is taken as given.
Moreover, it is assumed that a cartel can perfectly observe if it is a¤ected by a deviation, and the change
in the cartel’s size will in turn alter the cartel’s optimal response to the quantity set by the counterpart.
A cartel is "-stable at the pro…le (¹B ; ¹S ; ¯; ¾) if there exists a positive but arbitrarily small measure
" of agents such that no "-coalition of its members (non-members) bene…ts from defecting (joining) the
cartel. A pro…le (¹B ; ¹S; ¯; ¾) is an "-stable market outcome if and only if: (i) it is a market outcome,
(ii) both cartels are "-stable:
We will say that the pro…le (¹B ; ¹S ;¯ ; ¾) is a stable market outcome if it is the limit of "-stable market
outcomes when " ¡! 0:
The remainder of the paper is devoted to proving that the sets of "-stable and stable market outcomes
are non-empty, and to their characterization. This is done in two steps. In the …rst step, market outcomes
for generic cartel memberships (¹B ;¹S ) are characterized. In the second step, the constraints of stability
at the market outcomes are explored, providing the desired characterization and the proof of existence.
4 Market Outcomes
At this stage, we will explore the properties and the existence of market outcomes, that is of Nash
equilibria of the quantity-setting game G¹ with given measures of cartel memberships.
The following assertions about the properties of the buyers’ cartel payo¤s, B (¯; ¾), are useful to gain
some intuition about the results. The proofs are straightforward and will be omitted for the sake of
brevity. Similar claims hold for S (¯; ¾) :
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Claim 1 The payo¤ function B (¯; ¾) is continuous at all (¯; ¾) ; since ¼L(x; x) = ¼S (x;x) for all (x; x).
Claim 2 When ¾ > 0; the payo¤ function B (¯; ¾) is strictly increasing at ¯ = (1 ¡ ¹B) b: Therefore,
when supply is positive, there are always some members of the buyers’ cartel who actively trade.
Claim 3 When ¯ · ¾; the payo¤ function B (¯; ¾) is strictly concave. Therefore, if B (¯; ¾) ¸ B ¡¯0; ¾¢
for all ¯0 · ¾; then ¯ is such that
¯ = min
nb¯ (¾) ; ¾o ;
where b¯ (¾) solves
@
@¯ (¯ ¡ (1 ¡ ¹B) b)¼SB (¯; ¾) = 0 : (4)
Claim 4 When ¯ ¸ ¾; any critical point of the payo¤ function B (¯;¾ ) is a minimum. Therefore, if
B (¯; ¾) ¸ B ¡¯0; ¾¢ for all ¯0 ¸ ¾; either ¯ = b or ¯ = ¾:
Taking into account the above claims, one can conclude that ¯ (¾) ; the best reply of the buyers’ cartel
to any level of market supply, is one of the following three: (i) to be inactive, that is not to withdraw
any members and set ¯ (¾) = b; (ii) to match the opponents’ quantity, that is to set demand exactly
equal to supply ¯ (¾) = ¾, or (iii) to undercut the quantity traded on the sellers’ side and to set demand
below supply at a level satisfying condition (4), i.e. ¯ (¾) = b¯ (¾) < ¾. When does each one of the above
choices prevail?13
Suppose …rst that undercutting is not a payo¤-maximizing solution and that the cartel’s decision is
based on the comparison between its payo¤s when being inactive and when matching the sellers’ o¤er,
which are
B(b; ¾) = b¹B¼LB(b; ¾) and B(¾; ¾) = (¾ ¡ (1 ¡ ¹B) b)¼LB(¾; ¾) ;
respectively. Denote by ¾I»M the supply level which satis…es that B(b; ¾) = B(¾; ¾); whereby the
buyers’ cartel is exactly indi¤erent between being inactive and matching total supply at ¾ = ¾ I»M .
Then B(b; ¾) > B(¾; ¾) if and only if
¾ < 2(2¡° )(1¡¹B)b°(1+(1¡¹B)(3¡2°)) ´ ¾ I»M ; (5)
where ¾I»M is a decreasing function of the buyers’s cartel membership ¹B . The above condition is
trivially satis…ed when ¾I»M > s or equivalently when
0 < ¹B <
2(2¡°)(1¡° sb)
2(2¡°)¡° sb (3¡2°) ´ ¹I»MB < 1:
13In the sequel, the indeces I; M and U will refer to, respectively, a cartel being inactive, matching the quantity traded
on the other side of the market, or undercutting it.
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Hence the buyers’ cartel always prefers to remain inactive rather than to match total supply if its mem-
bership level is low enough, i.e. when ¹B < ¹I»MB :
Let us now address the case in which undercutting could be the payo¤-maximizing decision. Observe
that a solution to (4) satisfying ¯ < ¾ cannot exist when ° is too small, namely under high search
frictions. Indeed, condition (4) yields as the unique solution
b¯ (¾) ´ ¾(5¡2°)¡p¾(1¡°)(5¡2°)(¾¡°(1¡¹B)b)°(5¡2°) (6)
and under high search frictions, i.e. ° · °, it is always the case that b¯ (¾) > ¾ .14 For low frictions, i.e.
° > °; the cartel’s decision depends on the comparison between its payo¤s when undercutting and when
matching the sellers’ o¤er, which are
B(b¯ (¾ ) ; ¾) = ³b¯ (¾) ¡ (1 ¡ ¹B ) b´ ¼SB(b¯ (¾) ; ¾) and B(¾; ¾) = (¾ ¡ (1 ¡ ¹B) b)¼SB (¾; ¾) ;
respectively. The inequality B(¾; ¾) < B(b¯ (¾) ; ¾); together with @@ ¾ b¯ (¾) > 0 and b¯ (¾) < ¾; is satis…ed
if and only if
¾ > (1¡¹B)°b(1¡(5¡2°)(1¡°)) ´ ¾M»U ; (7)
The function ¾M »U is decreasing in ¹B and thus condition (7) never holds if ¾M»U ¸ s; that is if
0 < ¹B · °¡(1¡(5¡2°)(1¡°))
s
b
° ´ ¹M»UB < 1:
Moreover, ¾I»M · ¾M »U holds if and only if
0 < ¹B · 2(2¡°)(°
2¡(1¡(5¡2°)(1¡°)))
°2(3¡2°) ´ ¹ ;
a condition which is always satis…ed if ¹ ¸ 1; that is when search frictions are not too low, that is when
° < ° · 0:78203 ´ °;
in which case both ¹I»MB · ¹M»UB and ¹ > ¹M »UB hold. When ° > ° search frictions will be called very
low.
When ¹ < ¹B · 1 (implying that market frictions are very low), the payo¤-maximizing decision of
the buyers’ cartel cannot be to match ¾; and it is solely based on the comparison between its payo¤s
from being inactive and from undercutting the quantity o¤ered. Let ¾I»U be de…ned as the solution to
B(b; ¾) = B(b¯ (¾) ; ¾); where ¾M»U < ¾I»U < ¾I»M always holds for ¹ < ¹B · 1:15 Moreover, de…ne
¹I»UB as the solution to ¾I»U = s; with ¾I»U < s if and only if ¹B > ¹I»UB : Then reducing demand
14This involves some tedious, but otherwise straightforward algebra. See page 7 for the de…nition of high search frictions.
15We omit the analytical expression for ¾I»U , as it is uninformatively complicated, being ¾I»U one of the roots of a
fourth-degree polinomial equation.
11
to b¯ (¾) is the cartel’s optimal choice when sellers’ supply is such that ¾ ¸ ¾I»U , whereas remaining
inactive is the cartel’s payo¤-maximizing solution for ¾ < ¾I»U :
The optimal decisions of the sellers’ cartel are characterized analogously, with ¯I»M ;¯M»U ; ¯I»U
and ¹I»MS ; ¹
M»U
S ;¹
I»U
S de…ned symmetrically.
This completes the proof of Lemma 1 that follows.
For the remainder of the paper, and without loss of generality, we maintain the assumption that sellers
are the short side of the market and we normalize the measure of the long side, that is s · b = 1:
Lemma 1 (a) When search frictions are high, i.e. ° · °, the best reply function of the buyers’ cartel is
¯ (¾) =
8<: 1 if ¾ < min f¾I»M ; sg¾ if ¾ ¸ min f¾I»M ; sg (a)
and similarly the best reply of the sellers’ cartel is
¾ (¯) =
8<: s if ¯ < min f¯I»M ; 1gmin f¯;sg if ¯ ¸ min f¯I»M ; 1g :
(b) When search frictions are low, i.e. ° > °; and ¹B · ¹; the best reply function of the buyers’ cartel is
¯ (¾) =
8>>><>>>:
1 if ¾ < min f¾I»M ; sg
¾ if min f¾I»M ; sg · ¾ < minf¾M»U ; sgb¯ (¾) if ¾ ¸ min f¾M»U ; sg
(b)
and similarly (for ¹S · ¹ and ° > °); the sellers’ cartel best reply function is
¾ (¯ ) =
8>>>><>>>>:
s if ¯ < min f¯ I»M ; 1g
minf¯; sg if minf¯I»M ;1g · ¯ < min f¯M»U ; 1g
min
½b¾ (¯) = ¯(5¡2°)¡p¯(1¡°)(5¡2°)(¯¡°(1¡¹S)s)°(5¡2°) ; s¾ if ¯ ¸ min f¯M»U ; 1g
(c) When market frictions are very low, i.e. ° > °; and ¹ < ¹B · 1; the best reply function of the buyers’
cartel consists in
¯ (¾) =
8<: 1 if ¾ < min f¾I»U ; sgb¯ (¾) if ¾ ¸ min f¾I»U ; sg (c)
and similarly (when ¹ < ¹S · 1) the sellers’ cartel best reply function is
¾ (¯) =
8<: s if ¯ < minf¯I»U ; 1gmin fb¾ (¯) ; sg if ¯ ¸ minf¯I»U ; 1g :
12
sb(s)
b=1
sIiM s
s
Figure 1: (a) The reaction function of a moderate buyers’ cartel.
We will say that a cartel is moderate when, irrespectively of its size, the only relevant options that
it faces are either to be inactive or to match the opponent’s quantity. A cartel is moderate if and only
if search frictions are high, whereby either both the buyers’ and the sellers’ cartels are moderate or none
is. Observe that a moderate cartel will always be inactive if the fraction of its members is such that
¹i < ¹I»Mi ; with i = B; S: A cartel will be called radical if its best reply might consist in either being
inactive or undercutting the opponent’s quantity (but not matching). A cartel is radical if and only if its
size is high enough, i.e. ¹ < ¹i · 1; with i = B; S (a condition implying that market frictions are very
low). A radical cartel will always prefer to be inactive if the proportion of its membership is such that
¹ < ¹i · ¹I»Ui : Finally, we will say that a cartel is ‡exible if it can potentially respond to the opponent’s
quantity by staying inactive, matching, or undercutting. A cartel is always ‡exible if search frictions are
not too low and it is ‡exible if and only if search frictions are low and ¹i · ¹. Nevertheless, a ‡exible
cartel will always remain inactive if ¹i < ¹I»Mi ; and it will always prefer to match rather than undercut
the opponent’s volume of trade if ¹I»Mi · ¹i · ¹M»Ui . In these cases, the ‡exible cartel actually behaves
as a moderate one.
Example 1 below displays the buyers’ cartel reaction functions under the di¤erent scenarios contem-
plated in Lemma 1.
Example 1 (a) Suppose that the buyers’ cartel is moderate (equivalently search frictions are high, i.e.
° · °; and ¾ I»M < s): Then its reaction function is as the one displayed in Figure 1. Note that any
cartel membership ¹B < ¹I»MB would yield ¾I»M > s and thus matching ¾ would no longer be a relevant
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Figure 2: (b) The reaction function of a ‡exible buyers’ cartel.
option for the buyers’ cartel and ¯ (¾) = 1 for all ¾:
(b) Consider now a ‡exible buyers’ cartel and suppose that ¾I»M < ¾M»U < s, in which case the buyers’
cartel reaction function is represented as in Figure 2. In the event that ¾I»M < s < ¾M»U , or else
that ¹I»MB < ¹B < ¹M»UB ; undercutting would not be payo¤-maximizing and the buyers’ cartel best reply
function would look like the moderate cartel’s, displayed in Figure 1. Furthermore, if ¹B · ¹I»MB and
¾I»M ¸ s; then the buyers’ best response would be ¯ (¾) = 1 for all ¾:
(c) Final ly consider a radical buyers’ cartel. Its reaction function can be represented as in Figure 3 as
long as ¹B > ¹I»UB holds, otherwise ¯ (¾) = 1 for all ¾.
The best response functions characterized in Lemma 1 generate two distinct types of market outcomes.
On the one hand, the best responses may overlap for a non-empty interval along the diagonal. In this
case, all market outcomes yield a perfect match in the measures of active buyers and sellers, and at least
one cartel actively restrains trade. This symmetric trade scenario is attained when search frictions are
high and ¾I»M · s holds (no requirement is needed on ¯I»M). When search frictions are low, an outcome
with symmetric participation can prevail only if both cartels are ‡exible (i.e. if both ¾ I»M · ¾M»U and
¯I»M · ¯M»U hold, a constraint binding only under not too low frictions), and if and only if the best
response functions overlap along the diagonal, that is
q ´ minfmax f¯I»M ; ¾I»M g ; sg · min f¯M»U ; ¾M»U ; sg ´ q : (8)
On the other hand, when the best response functions do not overlap along the diagonal, they may
intersect at the boundaries. This yields a unique market outcome with asymmetric participation where
14
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Figure 3: (c) The reaction function of a radical buyers’ cartel.
one cartel is inactive; the other cartel may restrain its market participation so that it slightly undercuts
the opponent’s, or it may also remain inactive.16
The magnitude of absolute cartel memberships, ¹B and ¹Ss; determines whether the Nash equilibrium
of the game G¹ exists, and, if so, whether it is a symmetric market outcome or an asymmetric one. In
particular, if absolute membership levels are close to each other and su¢ciently high, then condition (8)
holds and symmetric market outcomes, with at least one cartel restraining its market participation, are
attained. Conversely, if cartel memberships are su¢ciently di¤erent, a unique Nash equilibrium prevails
in which the quantities traded are asymmetric, and where only the larger cartel restrains trade. Finally,
for intermediate cases, the game G¹ might not have a Nash equilibrium. Of course, when cartel sizes
(¹B ; ¹Ss) do not support a market outcome, then no pro…le (¹B ;¹S ; ¯; ¾) can be an "-stable market
outcome (neither a stable market outcome).
The proposition below characterizes the Nash equilibria of the game G¹, and gives the necessary and
su¢cient conditions for their existence. The proof follows straightforwardly from inspection of the best
response functions.17
Proposition 1 (a) Let search frictions be high (i.e. ° · °; implying that both cartels are moderate). If
being inactive and matching are both payo¤-maximizing options for the buyers’ cartel, i.e. ¹B ¸ ¹I»MB ,
16For the sake of completeness, let us point out that, when the best response functions intersect at the boundaries, there
also exists a unique market outcome with symmetric participation such that the sellers’ cartel is inactive and the buyers’
cartel matches s:
17See Example 2 below.
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Figure 4: (a) Multiplicity of equilibria.
then any strategy pair (¯; ¾) = (q; q) ; with q 2 £q; s¤ ; is a NE. Otherwise, the strategy pair (¯; ¾) = (1; s)
is the unique NE.
(b) Let search frictions be low, i.e. ° > ° . Then, a strategy pair (¯; ¾) = (q; q) ; with q 2 £q; q¤ ; is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if both cartels are ‡exible, i.e. ¹B ; ¹S · ¹ and (8) is satis…ed. Otherwise, the
unique Nash equilibrium is
(¯; ¾) =
8>>><>>>:
³b¯ (s) ; s´ if max f¾M»U ; ¾I»Ug · s and b¯ (s) < min f¯I»M ; ¯I»U g
(1; b¾ (1)) if max f¯M»U ; ¯I»U g · s and b¾ (1) < minf¾I»M ; ¾I»U ; sg
(1; s) if s < min f¾I»M ; ¾I»U g and b¾ (1) ¸ s:
; (9)
No NE exists when the conditions in (9) are not met.
Example 2 considers the range of market outcomes for ‡exible cartels.
Example 2 Let s = 45 be the ex ante measure of sellers, let search frictions be equal to ° =
3
4 and let the
proportion of buyers in the cartel be ¹B =
20
21.
(a) If the proportion of sellers in the cartel is ¹S = 3133 then the game G
20
21 ;
31
33 is such that all pairs
(¯; ¾) = (q; q) with q 2 £ 427 ; 27 ¤ represent equilibrium outcomes. This result is shown in Figure 4.
(b) Assume that ¹S = 2350 , then the unique equilibrium of game G
22
21 ;
23
50 is given by the pair
³b¯ (s) ; s´ =
(0:78; 0:8) and is shown in Figure 5.
(c) Finally, letting ¹S = 56 , it is straightforward to check that the game G
23
21 ;
5
6 has no Nash equilibrium,
as shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 5: (b) Uniqueness of the equilibrium.
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Figure 6: (c) Non-existence of an equilibrium.
17
5 Stability
Depending on the magnitudes of absolute cartel memberships ¹B and ¹Ss, a broad set of Nash equilibria
might exist. But not all market outcomes are equally relevant, because some of them cannot be supported
by stable levels of cartel memberships.
Indeed, given a pro…le (¹B ; ¹S ), at most a Nash Equilibrium of the cartel game is supported by stable
membership levels. We will show that, for a wide set of parameter con…gurations, there exist "-stable
(and stable) market outcomes with at least one active cartel. At these market outcomes, the quantities
traded must be symmetric, regardless of the potential measures of traders on each side of the market. If
frictions are low, "-stable (and stable) market outcomes, where only one cartel is active, exist as well. At
these outcomes, the active cartel is the one with greater absolute membership and it reduces its supply
or demand so as to slightly undercut the counterpart’s (unconstrained) market participation.
For further reference, observe that condition b¾ (1) < s is satis…ed if and only if
¹S >
(4¡° )¡(3(3¡°)¡(5¡2°)s°)s°
(1¡°)s° = ¹S :
Our next result establishes necessary and su¢cient conditions for "-stability.
Proposition 2 (i) A market outcome with symmetric market participation and at least the buyers’ cartel
being active, i.e. a pro…le (¹B ; ¹S ; q; q) with q · s, is "-stable if and only if either (a) trade is set at the
level ¯ = ¾ = ¯I»M = ¾I»M · s and neither cartel is radical being ¹I»MB · ¹B · ¹ and ¹I»MS · ¹S · ¹;
or (b) trade is set at (s; s) and ¹I»MB = ¹B and ¹S < min
©
¹I»MS ; ¹
I»U
S
ª
.
(ii) A market outcome with asymmetric participation and the buyers’ cartel only being active, i.e. a
pro…le
³
¹B ; ¹S ; b¯ (s) ; s´ ; is "-stable if and only if cartels are not moderate, the sellers’ cartel prefers to be
inactive, i.e. ¹S < min
©
¹I»MS ; ¹I»US
ª
; and either ¹B = ¹I»UB , or ¹B = ¹M»UB + " with s¡ " · b¯ (s) < s.
(iii) A market outcome with asymmetric participation and the sellers’ cartel only being active, i.e. a pro…le
(¹B ; ¹S ; 1; b¾ (1)) ; is "-stable if and only if cartels are not moderate, buyers always prefer to be inactive,
i.e. ¹B < min
©
¹I»MB ; ¹I»UB
ª
; and either ¹S = ¹M»US + " > ¹S (in this case s ¡ " < b¾ (1) < s for
s 2 (s" ;1]; with s" solving ¹M»US + " = ¹S ) or ¹S = ¹I»US > ¹S :
Proof. See Appendix A.
Observe that an "-stable outcome with only the sellers’ cartel being active might exist when the
market is balanced, i.e. if s = b = 1; or only if the total measure of sellers s is in…nitesimally smaller
than the total measure of buyers b. In this case the sellers’ cartel is active but only marginally so.
Also note that among "-stable market outcomes with asymmetric participation, only those where the
fraction of cartel members is ¹i = ¹I»Ui ; with i = B; S, survive in the limit as " ! 0.
A characterization of the set of stable market outcomes is presented in the next proposition, whose
proof is immediate and therefore omitted.
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Proposition 3 (i) The set of stable market outcomes with symmetric participation and at least the
buyers’ cartel being active coincides with the "-stable ones.
(ii) A market outcome with asymmetric participation and the buyers’ cartel only being active is stable if
and only if ¹B = ¹I»UB and ¹S < min
©
¹I»MS ; ¹
I»U
S
ª
:
(iii) A market outcome with asymmetric participation and the sellers’ cartel only being active is stable if
and only if ¹S = ¹I»US > ¹S and ¹B < min
©
¹I»MB ; ¹
I»U
B
ª
:
Remark 1 Note that ¯ = ¯ I»M = ¾I»M = ¾ is equivalent to
0 < ¹B = 1 ¡ (1¡¹S)s1+(1¡¹S)(3¡2°)(1¡s) < 1 ; (10)
so that, to every pair of cartel memberships satisfying (10), there corresponds a stable market outcome
with symmetric trade. Moreover, there always exist pairs of cartel memberships meeting the stability
requirements for a market outcome with asymmetric trade.
The level of trade at stable market outcomes with symmetric participation might be ine¢cient. More-
over, condition (10) is compatible with market outcomes in which the cartels control more and more
traders and force very limited market participation. In the limit, the market is driven to the collapse,
given that the pro…le (1; 1; 0; 0), is a stable market outcome for any level of market frictions.
Corollary 1 The set of stable market outcomes with symmetric trade includes ine¢cient pro…les such
that 0 · ¯I»M = ¾I»M < s: The degree of ine¢ciency is unbounded.
Nonetheless, Proposition 3 does not rule out market outcomes at which quantities are set equal to
the measure of the short side, ¯ = ¾ = s; thus the following holds.
Corollary 2 Stable market outcomes include e¢cient pro…les where ¹B = ¹I»MB and either ¹S = ¹I»MS
(which exists if and only if s = b = 1) or ¹S < min
©
¹I»MS ; ¹I»US
ª
: It is an outcome with symmetric
participation where the sellers’ cartel is not active and the buyers’ is active only to assure that demand
equals supply.
At stable market outcomes with symmetric participation and both cartel being active, the cartel on
the short side always withdraws from the market fewer traders than the cartel on the long side does. Does
the cartel on the long side necessarily control more traders than its opponent? Does it need to encompass
a relatively higher proportion of traders? These questions are answered in the following corollary.
Corollary 3 At stable market outcomes with symmetric trade and both cartel being active: (i) the buyers’
cartel controls more traders than the sellers’ cartel, i.e. ¹B > s¹S ; (ii) the buyers’ cartel always controls
a larger fraction of the total population on its side than the sellers’ cartel, i.e. ¹B > ¹S :
19
Proof. Taking into account condition (10), the inequality ¹B > s¹S holds if and only if
s¹S < 1 ¡ (1¡¹S)s1+(1¡¹S)(3¡2°)(1¡s) ; (11)
and it is straightforward to check that (11) holds for all ¹S and s: Inequality ¹S < ¹B also holds for all
s < 1:
At stable outcomes with asymmetric trade, the only active cartel slightly undercuts the opponent’s
participation level: Even though the active cartel actually withdraws a non-negligible measure of its
members, e¢ciency is only marginally a¤ected, since the level of realized trade decreases only by a small
amount. The distribution of surplus between buyers and sellers is again substantially altered in favor of
the side of the market where the cartel is active.
We may now summarize our results. There are stable market outcomes where both sides exercise
countervailing power. In this case, countervailing power might be the source of (potentially severe)
market ine¢ciency. However, in markets that are not balanced ex ante (maybe because the short side
has e¤ective means to prevent entry without compensation to excluded potential traders) there exist
stable outcomes at which the exercise of countervailing power by the long side a¤ects the distribution of
surplus without damaging e¢ciency. We …nd that these market outcomes (partially) vindicate Galbraith’s
claims that countervailing power plays a desirable role in some markets.
A Proof of Proposition 2
It is clear that there are no situations where a positive measure " of independent buyers or sellers have
incentive to deviate and to join the cartel on their side of the market. Indeed, outsiders obtain a higher
payo¤ than insiders provided that the cartel is active. Hence, the only relevant deviations are instances
in which a positive measure " of cartel members wish to defect from the cartel.
(a) Consider …rst market outcomes with symmetric trade.
² These outcomes can arise when reaction functions overlap along the diagonal, i.e. for cartel
memberships such that ¹B ; ¹S · ¹. In particular, assume that the fractions of cartel members
are such that
max f¯I»M ; ¾I»M g = ¾I»M · min f¯M»U ; sg = min f¯M»U ; ¾M»U ; sg
whereby equilibrium strategies are such that (¯; ¾) = (q; q) ; with
¾¹BI»M =
2(2¡°)(1¡¹B)
°(1+(1¡¹B)(3¡2°)) · q · minf¯M»U ; sg :
Suppose further that, at a given market outcome, a strictly positive measure " of cartel mem-
bers leave the buyers’ cartel. When such a defection occurs, the best reply function of the
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buyers’ cartel shifts towards the right, due to a decrease in cartel membership from ¹B to ¹B¡".
If the equilibrium measure of active traders q is such that ¾¹B¡"I»M · q · min f¯M »U ; sg ; then
we claim that leaving the cartel is bene…cial. Indeed, after the defection, the buyers’ car-
tel continues to set its measure of active traders equal to ¯¹B¡" (q) = q , which yields per
capita payo¤s ¼B (q; q) to outsiders (and to defecting cartel members). Prior to the defection,
the individual payo¤ to cartel members is B
¹B(q;q)
¹B
< ¼LB (q; q) : However, if q is such that
¾¹BI»M · q < ¾¹B¡"I»M ; then the buyers’ cartel breaks down completely as a consequence of the
defection, and it plays ¯¹B¡" (q) = 1: In this situation, defecting buyers would each receive a
payo¤ equal to ¼LB (1;q) ; and a defection would not be pro…table if
B¹B (q;q )
¹B
¸ ¼LB (1; q) ; which
is the case. Conversely, it remains pro…table for members of the sellers’ cartel to leave their
cartel, and consequently a defection of " members does not induce the sellers’ cartel to modify
the chosen measure q of active sellers, being ¯I»M · ¾I»M . The same reasoning applies when
max f¯I»M ; ¾I»M g = ¯I»M · minf¾M»U ; sg : Thus, in general, when ¹B ; ¹S · ¹; both
cartels are stable if and only if
¯ = ¯I»M =
2(2¡°)(1¡¹S)s
°(1+(1¡¹S)(3¡2°)) =
2(2¡°)(1¡¹B)
°(1+(1¡¹B)(3¡2°)) = ¾I»M = ¾ ;
which implies
¹B = 1 ¡ (1¡¹S)s1+(1¡¹S)(3¡2°)(1¡s) :
A stable market outcome with symmetric trade thus exists when ¹I»MB · ¹B · ¹ and ¹I»MS ·
¹S · ¹.
² Consider now the case in which a market outcome with symmetric trade arises when the
reaction functions intersect at the boundaries. It is straightforward to check that deviations
are not pro…table if and only if the sellers’ cartel is inactive and the buyers’ cartel just matches
s; that is for ¾I»M = s and ¹S < min
©
¹I»MS ; ¹I»US
ª
.
(b) Secondly, consider market outcomes with asymmetric trade and suppose that the strategy pair³b¯ (s) ; s´ is played.
² Suppose, for the time being, that max f¾M»U ; ¾I»U g = ¾M»U and consider a potential defec-
tion from the buyers’ cartel. After the deviation, the measure of buyers in the cartel becomes
¹B ¡ " and the cartel’s best reply function shifts slightly towards the right. Such a defec-
tion has three possible consequences, depending on the magnitude of ¹B ¡ ". (i) The buyers’
cartel continues to respond to the total quantity s o¤ered by setting ¯ (s) = b¯¹B¡" (s), and
the equilibrium of the quantity-setting game is
³b¯¹B¡" (s) ; s´ : This occurs when ¾¹B¡"M»R < s;
or equivalently when ¹B ¡ " > ¹M»UB ; and when b¯¹B¡" (s) < min f¯ I»M ; ¯I»U g · s: We
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claim that, when no cartel is active on the supply side, it is pro…table for a measure " > 0 of
members of the buyers’ cartel to defect. Observe that the per capita utility of outsiders after
the defection is equal to
¼SB
³b¯¹B¡" (s) ; s´ = ° (5¡2°)(s¡° (1¡¹B+"))¡p(s(1¡° )(5¡2°)(s¡°(1¡¹B+")))4(s¡°(1¡¹B+")) ; (12)
whereas the per capita utility that cartel members receive prior to the defection is
B(b¯¹B (s);s)
¹B
= (s¡(1¡¹B)°)(5¡2°)+s(1¡°)¡2
p
s(1¡°)(5¡2°)(s¡(1¡¹B)°)
4¹B
: (13)
Furthermore note that ¼SB
³b¯¹B (s) ; s´ > B( b¯¹B(s);s)¹B always holds and that ¼SB ³b¯¹B¡" (s) ; s´
is decreasing in ": Thus, for " small enough, expression (12) is strictly greater than (13). (ii)
After the defection, the buyers’ cartel demands b¯¹B¡" (s) but no equilibrium of the quantity-
setting game exists. This is the case when minf¯I»M ;¯ I»U g < s and minf¯I»M ; ¯ I»U g ·b¯¹B¡" (s) < s. This situation could then be discarded. (iii) The buyers’ cartel sets ¯ (s) = s
and the equilibrium of the game is (s; s) : Then, it must be that ¾¹B¡"M»U ¸ s; or equivalently
that ¹B ¡ " · ¹M»UB ; and that minf¯I»M ; ¯I»Ug > s: When this defection occurs, cartel
members have individual payo¤ (13) before the defection, which is greater than ¼B (s; s), the
outsiders’ individual payo¤. Therefore, if cartel memberships are such that ¹B = ¹M»UB + "
and ¹S < min
©
¹I»MS ; ¹I»UB
ª
, the pro…le
³
¹B ; ¹S ; b¯ (s) ; s´ is "-stable.
² When instead max f¾M»U ; ¾I»U g = ¾I»U and a defection from the buyers’ cartel occurs,
the following cases have to be considered. (i) The buyers’ cartel continues to respond setting
¯ (s) = b¯¹B¡" (s), and the outcome of the quantity-setting game is ³b¯¹B¡" (s) ; s´. If ¾¹B¡"I»U <
s; which implies b¯¹B¡" (s) < minf¯I»M ; ¯I»U; sg ; then the deviation is pro…table. (ii) The
buyers’ cartel plays b¯¹B¡" (s) ; but no Nash equilibrium exists. (iii) When ¾¹B¡"I»U ¸ s; or
equivalently ¹B ¡ " · ¹I»UB ; the defection from the cartel triggers the response ¯¹B¡" (s) = 1;
in which case the equilibrium outcome is (1;s) and the deviating members are not better
o¤. Then the pro…le
³
¹B ; ¹S; b¯ (s) ; s´ is an "-stable market outcome for ¹B = ¹I»UB and
¹S > max
©
¹I»MS ; ¹I»US
ª
:
(c) Finally, consider market outcomes of the form (¹B ; ¹S; 1; b¾ (1)) : In order for such a pro…le to be an
"-stable market outcome, it must be the case that the strategy pair (1; b¾ (1)) be a Nash equilibrium
of the quantity-setting game G¹: Recall that b¾ (1) < s if and only if
¹S >
(4¡°)¡(3(3¡°)¡(5¡2°)s°)s°
(1¡° )s° = ¹S :
Therefore, the pro…le
¡
¹B ; ¹M »US + "; 1; b¾ (1)¢ ; where ¹B · ¹I»MB ; is "-stable only if the condition
¹
S
< ¹M»US + " < 1 is also satis…ed, which is the case if and only if s > s";where s" solves
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¹M»US + " = ¹S and is such that
s" ´ (4¡° )+°
2(5¡2°)+"°(1¡°)¡
q
(1¡° )(°2(1¡°)"2+2°((5¡2°)°2+(4¡°))"+(1¡°)(4+3° ¡2°2)2)
2(5¡2°)° 2 ;
with s" < 1 being true for all " > 0: In addition. the pro…le
¡
¹B ; ¹I»US ; 1; b¾ (1)¢ represents an
"-stable market outcome if and only if ¹S = ¹I»US > ¹S and ¹B < min
©
¹I»MB ; ¹I»UB
ª
:
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